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INTRODUCTION
The United States has come a long way in promoting racial equality
since the 1866 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts, but racial animus still plays
an impermissible role in many contracting and employment decisions.
Comcast Corporation v. National Association of African AmericanOwned Media and Entertainment Studios offers the Supreme Court the
opportunity to decide which causal standard applies to claims alleging
racial bias in contracting under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, the Court
will decide whether § 1981 requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that racial
animus was the but-for cause or simply a motivating-factor in the
defendant’s refusal to contract. Section 1981, originally enacted under
Section One of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, guarantees that all
individuals have the “same right” to contract as white citizens.1 While
the Court has determined the applicable causal standards under
similarly operating statutes, such as Title VII and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),2 it has never squarely
addressed the issue regarding § 1981 claims.3
Copyright © 2020 Catherine Tarantino
∗
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1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
2. For more information comparing Title VII and § 1981, see infra Part II.B.
3. See United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Disparate Treatment – MixedMotive Claim, INSTRUCTIONS FOR RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(May 2016), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/6_Chap_6_2014_spring_with_July_
update. (Last visited Jan. 29, 2020) [hereinafter Instructions for Race Discrimination Claims]
(highlighting the lack of precedent on § 1981’s causal burden making it unclear whether a mixed-
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This Commentary argues that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires a motivating
factor, rather than a but-for causal standard. A but-for causal standard
presents an extremely high burden to plaintiffs, especially at the
pleading stage where defendants often have sole access to potentially
incriminating evidence. This causal burden impacts those who do not
fall under Title VII’s definition of “employee,” and rely on § 1981 as
their avenue for redress. By denying a remedy to such individuals when
they confront discriminatory contracting practices, § 1981’s promise of
granting people of color the “same right” to contract as white
individuals is unfulfilled. In contrast, a motivating-factor causal
standard would make it easier for plaintiffs to bring successful § 1981
claims and vindicate their right to contract free of racial animus.4
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit’s
holding and interpret § 1981 to require a motivating-factor standard.
I. FACTS
The National Association of African American-Owned Media and
Entertainment Studios Networks, Inc. (“ESN”), Respondent in this
case, is an African American-owned media company that owns,
operates, and distributes seven television channels.5 Starting in 2008,
ESN engaged in conversations with Comcast Corporation
(“Comcast”), Petitioner in this case, seeking carriage of their channels
on Comcast’s cable distribution platform.6
When ESN first offered Comcast its channels, Comcast declined,
claiming that ESN needed support from Comcast’s regional offices.7
When ESN obtained support from the regional offices, Comcast
declined again, this time requiring ESN to gain support from Comcast’s
division offices.8 Upon traveling to these division offices,
representatives informed ESN that their support was insignificant

motive claims are actionable).
4. Brief of Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and Twenty-One National
Organizations as Amici Curiae In support of Respondents at 23, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
African Am.-Owned Media, Inc., 2019 WL 3824689 (August 8, 2019) (No. 18-1171), petition for
cert filed, (March 8, 2019) (No. 18-1171) [hereinafter Brief of Lawyers’ Committee] (“Allowing
litigants to prevail if race played an impermissible role in contractual decisions is the fairest way
to address race discrimination in contracting.”).
5. Brief for Respondents at 1, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n African American-Owned
Media and Entm’t Studios, Inc., 2019 WL 3824689 (Sept. 23, 2019) (No. 18-1171) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondents].
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id. at 4.
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because they “deferred to the decision of the corporate office.”9 Finally,
Comcast denied ESN’s channels a third time, citing insufficient bandwidth.10 Despite these claims, Comcast has launched more than eighty
white-owned networks since 2010, including lesser known and less
successful channels than those owned by ESN.11 As one Comcast
executive allegedly said, they were not “trying to create any more Bob
Johnsons.”12 In response, ESN filed suit against Comcast, alleging that
racial animus fueled Comcast’s refusal to carry their channels in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Their claim was based on the idea that
ESN had not been given the “same right” to contract as white-owned
media companies.13
ESN filed this action against Comcast and several other parties,
claiming that they refused to carry ESN’s channels because of their
status as a one hundred percent African American-owned media
company.14 The original complaint alleged that Comcast and the other
parties conspired to discriminate against one hundred percent African
American-owned media companies in favor of networks with symbolic
minority ownership,15 who were granted carriage under Memoranda of
Understanding (MOU).16 ESN asserted that the MOU was a sham to
“whitewash Comcast’s discriminatory business practices.”17 Comcast
and the other parties moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under
§ 1981.18 The district court granted the motion to dismiss.19

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 4–5.
12. Id. (“Bob Johnson is the African American founder of Black Entertainment Television
(“BET”), a groundbreaking network”).
13. Id. at 28–29
14. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned
Media and Entm’t Studios, Inc., 2019 WL 3824689 (Aug. 8, 2019) (No. 18–1171) [hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner] (filing claims against former FCC Commissioner Meredith Atwell Baker, the
NAACP, the National Urban League, the National Action Network, Al Sharpton, and Time
Warner Cable).
15. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5 at 52–53 (claiming that the MOU networks were
substantially white-owned with an African American “figure head” instead of truly being
minority-owned).
16. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 7–8 (Under the MOU, Comcast collaborated with
the NAACP and the Urban League to devise a plan which would provide minority-owned
networks “avenues for seeking carriage from Comcast beyond those ordinarily available to
others.”).
17. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 8.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Id.
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ESN then filed its First Amended Complaint which alleged all of
the previous claims except for conspiracy.20 Comcast again filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and again the district court
granted the Motion.21 The Second Amended Complaint, this time filed
against Comcast alone, elaborated on Comcast’s interactions with ESN
and the white-owned channels that Comcast chose to carry.22 For a third
time, Comcast filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and
the district court granted the Motion.23 ESN appealed the decision to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.24
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that ESN stated sufficient facts
from which the court could “plausibly infer that [ESN] experienced
disparate treatment due to race.”25 Moreover, Comcast’s band-width
explanation was not “so compelling as to render Plaintiff’s theory of
racial animus implausible.”26 The Ninth Circuit subsequently denied
Comcast’s petition for a panel rehearing and a rehearing en banc.27 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 10, 2019 to decide whether
§ 1981 claims require a motivating-factor or a but-for causal standard.28
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the 1866 Civil Rights Act
Title 42 of the United States Code § 1981(a) states that “[a]ll
persons . . . shall have the same right . . . in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.”29 A
plaintiff may recover compensatory and punitive damages under §
1981.30 Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, § 1981

20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. (holding that ESN failed to plead enough facts to make a plausible claim for relief in
light of Comcast’s legitimate business reasons for denial of carriage).
22. See id. at 10–12 (discussing Comcast’s refusal to contract with ESN even though it
contracted with white-owned channels and minority-owned media companies while excluding
ESN as a 100% African-American owned media company).
23. Id. at 1 n. 1.
24. Id. at 2
25. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 743 Fed. App’x. 106,
107 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 2693, 1089 (2019).
26. Id.
27. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 914 F.3d 1261 (9th
Cir. 2019).
28. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media, 139 S. Ct. 2693, 2693–
94 (2019).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2012).
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was designed to reinforce the Thirteenth Amendment and render the
Black Codes unlawful.31 The Black Codes were laws enacted to keep
freed slaves in coercive labor agreements so that the Southern
plantation economy could remain intact.32 The Civil Rights Act of 1866
responded directly to the Black Codes, granting African Americans the
same right as white individuals to contract, own, transfer, and inherit
property, and to serve on juries.33
Since 1866, two significant adjustments have been made to § 1981.
The first significant adjustment to the statute came in Runyon v.
McCrary.34 In Runyon, the Court created a private right of action in
§1981 claims, holding that Virginia private schools violated § 1981 by
refusing to admit African American students.35 Consequently, plaintiffs
may bring § 1981 claims against both private actors and the
government.36 The second significant adjustment occurred when
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which defined “make and
enforce contracts” as “the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.”37 Congress
added this definition to § 1981 to override Patterson v. McClean Credit
Union,38 which held that discriminatory actions made after the
completion of a contract were not subject to liability under § 1981.39
Since the 1991 amendment, Congress has not made any substantial
changes to the language of § 1981.

31. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 427 (1968) (“For the same Congress that
wanted to do away with the Black Codes also had before it an imposing body of evidence pointing
to the mistreatment of Negroes by private individuals . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
32. John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of
the Laws”, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 143 (1950) (“Under the pre-rebellion black codes, the free
Negro’s position differed little from that of slave, except that a freedman had the right to the fruits
of his own labor.”).
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, 1983 (2012).
34. 427 U.S. 160, 173–74 (1976).
35. Id. at 173 (“[T]his consistent interpretation of the law necessarily requires the conclusion
that § 1981, like § 1982, reaches private conduct.”).
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2012).
38. Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370, 1373 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 . . . amends § 1981 to overrule Patterson.”).
39. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989) (holding that § 1981 does
not provide a remedy for discrimination when the conduct “occurs after the formation of a
contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce established contract obligations”).
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B. Title VII and Mixed Motive Claims
Plaintiffs bringing workplace discrimination suits, particularly
claims regarding discriminatory hiring and contracting practices, often
file claims under both Title VII and § 1981 because the two statutes
work in tandem to help employees bring claims alleging workplace
discrimination.40 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, now codified as
42 U.S.C. §2000(e), forbids employment discrimination “because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”41 To bring
a claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must follow a detailed procedure.42
When a plaintiff believes she has encountered discriminatory hiring
practices, she must first file a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which then determines whether
impermissible discrimination was a factor in the employment practice.43
If the EEOC determines that impermissible discrimination has taken
place, the employer is then given the opportunity to change their
practices according to a timeline dictated by the EEOC report.44 Only
after the employer has failed to fix these discriminatory practices can
the plaintiff file a claim in court.45
The difficult procedure that plaintiffs must follow to bring a Title
VII claim is balanced by Title VII’s recognition of mixed-motive claims
with an accompanying burden-shifting framework.46 In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the court recognized mixed-motive claims
under Title VII, holding that when an employee’s status as a member
of a protected class is a motivating factor in the employment decision,
she has stated a proper claim under § 1981.47 This motivating-factor
40. See Instructions for Race Discrimination Claims, supra note 2 (“The protections afforded
by Section 1981 may in many cases overlap with those of Title VII. But the standards and
protections of the two provisions are not identical.”).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991).
42. See Brief For the Chamber of Commerce of the United States Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioners at 10–11, Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am. Owned Media, Inc., 2019
WL 3824689 (Aug. 8, 2019) (No. 18–1171), petition for cert filed, (Mar. 8, 2019) (referring to
Section 1981’s creation of an “express, finely reticulated private cause of action”).
43. Filing a Lawsuit in Federal Court, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Nov. 24,
2019), https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
44. See Overview of Federal Sector EEOC Complaint Process, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N) https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/complaint_overview.cfm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2020).
45. See id.
46. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244–45 (1989) (If discriminatory intent
“played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid finding of liability
only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not [taken gender into
account].”).
47. See id. (“[O]nce a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a motivating part
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standard then triggers a burden-shifting framework through which
employers can defend themselves.48 Once an employee shows by a
preponderance of the evidence that her status as a member of a
protected class was a factor in the employment decision, the burden
then shifts to the employer to show “that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s [status] into account.”49
If an employer is successful in this showing, the court may prevent the
employee from recovering any damages or limit the amount of
damages the employee can seek.50
C. The Interaction between Title VII and § 1981.
For most employees, Title VII and § 1981 work in tandem as
protections against discriminatory hiring practices.51 For example, if an
African-American doctor is not hired by a hospital because of his race,
he can bring both a Title VII claim because he was denied equal
employment, and also a § 1981 claim because he was denied the same
opportunity to enter into an employment contract as a white doctor.
Under Title VII, he must follow the EEOC procedure, but only needs
to show that his race was a motivating factor in the hospital’s decision
not to hire him. Under § 1981, however, he must show that his race was
the but-for cause of the hospital’s refusal to hire him. Under this
system, the African-American doctor has two legal claims to vindicate
his right to employment free of racial animus.
Plaintiffs may only take advantage of Title VII, however, if they are
“employees,” defined as “individual[s] employed by an employer[.]”52
To take another example, if instead of a doctor, the African-American
man is the owner of a media company seeking to enter into an
agreement with a cable company, he is not an “employee” and thus may
not take advantage of Title VII. The only recourse he has is § 1981,

in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.”).
48. See id. at 249 (“[O]nce the plaintiff had shown that his constitutionally protected speech
was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating factor’ in the adverse treatment of him by his employer, the
employer was obligated to prove ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision as to [the plaintiff] even in the absence of the protected conduct.’”) (quoting
Mt. Healthy City Bd. Of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
49. Id. at 258.
50. Id. at 252 (holding that for an employer to mitigate liability the employer “must show
that its legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same decision”).
51. See Johnson v. Ry. Exp. Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975) (holding that Title VII
and § 1981 “augment each other, and are not mutually exclusive”).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2012).
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where he must show that that racial animus was the but-for cause of
the cable company’s refusal to contract. Simply because this AfricanAmerican man operates his own company, he is at a substantial
disadvantage when seeking a remedy because he must satisfy a but-for
causal standard instead of a motivating factor standard. Without Title
VII’s lower causal standard as a second avenue for redress, the AfricanAmerican business owner will likely not be able to vindicate his right
to contract free of racial animus.
III. HOLDING
The same day that the Ninth Circuit ruled on the present case, it
also ruled on a different case, National Association of African
American-Owned Media and Entertainment Studios Inc. v. Charter
Communications.53 ESN’s allegations against Charter Communications
(“Charter”) were substantially similar to the allegations against
Comcast.54 Charter defended their choice not to carry ESN’s channels
as due to a lack of bandwidth.55 In Charter, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
mixed motive claims are cognizable under § 1981, holding that “[i]f
discriminatory intent plays any role in a defendant’s decision not to
contract . . . then that plaintiff has not enjoyed the same right as a white
citizen.”56 Therefore, “[e]ven if racial animus was not the but-for cause
of a defendant’s refusal to contract, a plaintiff can still prevail if she
demonstrates that discriminatory intent was a factor in that
decision[.]”57
The Ninth Circuit applied the Charter holding to the case at issue,
ruling that ESN stated a proper claim under § 1981 because it plausibly
alleged that racial discrimination was “a factor” in Comcast’s refusal to
carry ESN’s channels.58 Even though Comcast had cited some raceneutral reasons for denying ESN’s channels, such reasons were not so
strong as to make ESN’s “theory of racial animus implausible.”59 In
light of the Ninth Circuit reading § 1981 to require a motivating-factor
53. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 13.
54. See Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media and Entm’t Studios, Inc. v. Charter
Commc’ns, 908 F.3d 1190, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2018) (alleging that Charter refused to carry their
channels because they are an African American-owned business, while Charter’s business
justifications include limited bandwidth).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1199 (emphasis in original).
57. Id.
58. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media v. Comcast Corp., 743 Fed. App’x. 106,
107 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 2693 (2019).
59. Id.
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causal standard, Comcast appealed the decision and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.60
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Petitioner’s Argument
Before the Supreme Court, Comcast argues that ESN did not
present a cognizable § 1981 claim because they could not show that
ESN’s status as a one hundred percent African-American-owned
company was the but-for cause in Comcast’s decision not to carry their
channels.61 First, Comcast argues that the plain language of § 1981
requires a but-for causal standard62 because “a plaintiff who would not
have been able to make a contract irrespective of his race has not been
denied the same right [to contract].”63 Put simply, Comcast would have
refused to carry ESN’s channels even if it were owned by a white man,
instead an African-American man. Assuming that § 1981’s language is
ambiguous rather than plain, Comcast argues that under University of
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,64 but-for causation still
must be applied to the statute. 65 In Nassar, the Court considered the
proper causal standard for Title VII retaliation claims.66 The Court
recognized that when analyzing statutes based on tort law, including
discrimination, but-for causation is the “default [rule] . . . absent an
indication to the contrary in the statute itself.”67 Because there is no
explicit causal language in § 1981, the default but-for causation rule
applies.68
Second, Comcast argues that but-for causation must be the
standard for § 1981 claims because it was “the sine qua non of tort
liability when § 1981 was enacted in 1866.”69 When enacting the Civil
60. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media, 139 S. Ct. 2693, 2693–
94 (2019).
61. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 40 (“The Ninth Circuit’s erroneous conclusion that
the Plaintiffs did not need to plead but-for causation has no basis in law.”).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 19 (internal quotations omitted).
64. 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
65. Id. at 3 (citing Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013)).
66. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 343 (2013) (“The question the
Court must answer here is whether that lessened causation standard is applicable to claims of
unlawful employer retaliation under § 2000e-3(a).”).
67. Id. at 347.
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 23 (arguing that the but-for default rule must apply
in this case because there is no express motivating factor causal language in § 1981).
69. Id.
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Rights Act of 1866, Congress relied heavily on the common law, which
required but-for causation as “one of the indispensable elements to
establish legal causation.”70 The Court did not loosen this strict causal
standard until 1981, when it recognized mixed-motive claims under
Title VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.71 Therefore, the enacting
Congress could not have intended § 1981 to require a motivating-factor
causal standard because it was not yet in the legal landscape.
Third, Comcast asserts that § 1981 requires but-for causation
because Congress had the opportunity to specifically authorize mixedmotive claims under § 1981 in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 but chose
not to do so.72 In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, recognizing a motivating-factor causal standard
under Title VII.73 Congress did not, however, change § 1981’s causal
standard while amending the statute to provide a definition for “make
and enforce contracts.74 By adding this definition to § 1981, Congress
was clearly considering the scope and application of the statute and
could have added a causal standard if it had wanted.75 Congress’s
choice not to add a causal standard to § 1981 indicates that Congress
consented to the but-for causation default rule.76
In light of Congress’ inaction, the expressio unius canon further
compels reading § 1981 as limiting the “motivating-factor standard only
to those causes of Action to which Congress advertently made that
standard pertinent and not to others.”77 The Court endorsed this
reasoning in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, where it considered
whether mixed-motive claims were cognizable under the ADEA.78
Applying expressio unius, the Court held that but-for causation is
proper under the ADEA because Congress specifically amended Title
VII to require a motivating-factor causal standard, but declined to
70. Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103, 109 (1911).
71. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (holding that mixed motive
claims are cognizable under Title VII).
72. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 28.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 28 (“Although the 1991 Act dispensed with but-for causation in limited respects
for some antidiscrimination claims, it notably did not extend that new causation standard to
Section 1981.”) (emphasis in original).
75. See id. at 31 (“Congress’s decision not to apply the motivating-factor standard to Section
1981 claims was hardly an accident.”).
76. See id. (explaining that Congressional inaction demonstrates a decision to not extend
mixed motive claims to § 1981 claims).
77. Id. at 17.
78. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009) (“We cannot ignore Congress’
decision to amend Title VII’s relevant provisions but not make similar changes to the ADEA.”).
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make such changes to the ADEA in 1991.79 Because Congress did not
add a motivating-factor causal standard to the language of § 1981, just
as it chose not to amend the ADEA, Congress must have intended §
1981 to require a but-for causal standard.
Furthermore, Petitioner argues that the Congressional inaction
here is even weightier than in Gross because anything other than a butfor causal standard would “vitiate the carefully crafted regime that
Congress enacted with respect to status-based discrimination under
Title VII.”80 To bring a Title VII claim, plaintiffs must follow the specific
EEOC procedures, and the remedies available are limited.81 Under §
1981, plaintiffs are not required to follow the EEOC procedure and are
also entitled to compensatory and punitive damages.82 Therefore, if
plaintiffs are allowed to bring mixed-motive claims under § 1981, there
will be no reason for them to bring Title VII claims, as they could avoid
its multi-step procedure.83 Previously, the Court has sought to avoid this
result because “[w]here conduct is covered by both § 1981 and Title VII,
the detailed procedures of Title VII are rendered a dead letter.”84
Section 1981 should not be construed so as to nullify Congress’s
carefully created scheme under Title VII.85
Fourth, in cases where the Court has analyzed § 1981 claims, it has
applied a but-for causal standard.86 Private claims under § 1981 are a
judicially implied right of action, requiring the “contours of the action
. . . to be judicially delimited . . . unless Congress resolves the
questions.”87 In previous § 1981 cases, the Court used language
invoking but-for causation, such as “because of” the plaintiff’s race,
“solely because of the plaintiff’s race,” and “solely because of [his] race
and color.”88 In using this language, the Court created a scheme in

79. Id. (“When Congress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to
have acted intentionally.”).
80. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 32.
81. See Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/remedies.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2020).
82. Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
83. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 33 (“Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
however, there would be no reason for a plaintiff to ever follow this carefully crafted regime when
broader liability and more expansive remedies are available under Section 1981.”).
84. Id. at 32–33 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989)).
85. Id. at 32, 33.
86. See id. at 39 (“This Court has consistently read Section 1981’s judicially implied private
right of action to require a showing that the challenged action was taken ‘because of’ the plaintiff’s
race.”).
87. See id. at 34–35 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975)).
88. See id. at 35–36 (citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 60 (1917)); see also Jones v.
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which plaintiffs bringing § 1981 claims against private actors must
satisfy a but-for causal standard.89 Through its decisions construing §
1981, the Court has shaped the “contours” the statute to require a butfor causal standard.
Lastly, Comcast asserts that although the Civil Rights Act of 1866
was a sweeping piece of legislation, § 1981 is just one narrow and
limited piece of that legislation.90 The contracts provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was meant to specifically address the Black Codes
in the South, which prohibited African-Americans from entering into
voluntary contracts for hire.91 Section 1981 was simply never meant to
reach relationships like the one between Comcast and ESN; it was
“designed to police discrimination that has [a] dispositive impact on the
right to contract.”92 Rather than being a “cure-all” approach to any
kind of alleged discrimination, § 1981 was aimed at ameliorating racism
that impacted the end result, rather than the process, of a contract.93
Section 1981, therefore, does not apply to ESN’s claim because
Comcast would have rejected ESN’s channels regardless of ESN’s
ownership’s race—racial discrimination did not have a “dispositive
impact” on ESN’s right to contract.94
B. Respondent’s Argument
First, ESN emphasizes that the Court has already recognized a
motivating-factor standard with an accompanying burden-shifting
framework under § 1981.95 In Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, the
Court “expressly held that the burden shifting framework developed
under Title VII [mixed-motive claims] applies to claims brought under

Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 419 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170–71 (1976);
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 605 (1987).
89. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 35 (arguing that the Court has been using
“because of” language when analyzing & § 1981 claims since Warley, 245 U.S. 60); see also Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176, 177 (2009) (reasoning that “because of” means “by reason
of” and the “the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the “but-for’
cause of the employer’s adverse action”).
90. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 21 (arguing that § 1981 is limited in nature).
91. See John P. Frank and Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of Equal Protection
Laws, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 144–45 (1950) (arguing that the Black Codes functioned to keep
African-Americans dependent on and subordinate to white men).
92. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 21.
93. See id. (arguing that § 1981 does not provide relief except when racial discrimination has
a “dispositive impact on the right to contract”).
94. Id.
95. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 18 (“This Court has already decided that burden
shifting is appropriate under Section 1981 and there is no basis for overruling that precedent.”).
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[S]ection 1981.”96 Although Congress abrogated Patterson’s holding
that post-contract racial harassment claims are not cognizable under §
1981, it did not touch the Court’s holding recognizing a motivatingfactor causal standard, triggering the burden-shifting framework.97
Therefore, all that is required to seek relief under § 1981 is a showing
that racial discrimination was a motivating factor in the refusal to
contract.98
Moreover, stare decisis directs the court to uphold this burdenshifting framework.99 Because stare decisis allows for greater reliance
on judicial decisions, provides notice to potential litigants, and
promotes predictability, the Court “will not depart from . . . stare decisis
without some compelling justification.”100 When construing statutory
law, the Court applies a heightened stare decisis to curb legislating from
the bench and unpredictable results.101 Here, no compelling
justification exists for the Court to cast aside its heightened stare decisis
standard and overrule the burden-shifting framework.102
Second, the plain text of § 1981 compels a motivating-factor causal
standard triggering a burden-shifting framework.103 The critical
language at issue is “same right”104 and an African American plaintiff
does not have the “same right” to contract “if race is used as a
motivating factor for denying him . . . the ability to enter into a
contract.”105 Both past and present dictionary definitions of “same”
bolster this reading because each dictionary lists “identical” as one of
the first definitions.106 Under this definition of “same,” ESN has not
been afforded the same right to contract because it was denied carriage
when Comcast accepted less successful white-owned networks.107
96. 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989).
97. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 13 (arguing that the 1991 Amendment “left
the burden shifting holding of this decision untouched”).
98. See id. at 18 (arguing that the Court adopted the burden-shifting framework in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989)).
99. Id. at 24.
100. Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991).
101. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 13 (“[B]ecause Patterson involved
interpretation of a statute, this court applies stare decisis with enhanced force.”) (internal
quotation omitted).
102. Id. at 26.
103. See id. at 28 (arguing that a motivating-factor standard is compelled by the text of
§
1981).
104. Id. at 28–29.
105. Id. at 29.
106. See id. (citing An American Dictionary of the English Language (1964) and Johnson’s
English Dictionary, as Improved by Todd (1828)).
107. Id. at 4–5.
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Furthermore, in contrast to Comcast’s argument that § 1981 only
guarantees that the outcome of the contracting decision be the same,
ESN argues that the entire contracting process must be identical.108 As
mentioned by Comcast, in 1991 Congress amended § 1981 by defining
“make and enforce” contracts to include the process of creating and
revising a contract.109 What Comcast ignored, however, is that by adding
“making, performance, and modification” to the definition, Congress
created a scheme that protects against racial discrimination in all stages
of contracting, not just the result.110 Therefore, if racial discrimination
is a motivating factor at any stage of the contracting process, the
plaintiff has a cognizable claim under § 1981.111
In addition, a but-for causal standard is inappropriate under § 1981
because the statute lacks “because of” causal language.112 In Gross, the
Court held that ADEA claims required a but-for causal standard
because the statute included the words “because of” which require
“that age discrimination be the reason that the employer decided to
act”; “therefore, a plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause
of the employer’s adverse decision.”113 The Court followed the Gross
reasoning in Nassar, where the Court decided which causal standard
applied to retaliation claims under Title VII.114 Just as it found “because
of” dispositive in Gross, the Court decided that the “because of”
language in the retaliation provision in Title VII triggered a but-for
causal standard. Most importantly, the Nassar Court contrasted Title
VII’s retaliation language with § 1981, which lacked “because of” in its
text.115 Without language triggering but-for causation, § 1981 imposed
a “broad general bar” on discrimination rather than a strict but-for
causal standard.116 Absent such “because of” language, but-for

108. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 30.
109. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 14, at 29–30.
110. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 36 (“Congress stated that it was responding
‘to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes
in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.’”) (quoting the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071).
111. See id. at 39 (“It is beyond a stretch for Comcast to argue . . . that Congress in passing the
1991 Act intended for section 1981 plaintiffs to plead that racial discrimination was a but-for cause
of the refusal to contract.”).
112. See id. at 14 (“[T]his Court has required but-for causation for statues that use words such
as ‘because,’ ‘because of,’ or ‘based on.’”).
113. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176, 178 (2009).
114. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013).
115. Id. at 355–56.
116. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 32.
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causation is not triggered, and therefore not appropriate for § 1981
claims.
Third, ESN points to § 1981’s legislative history to support the claim
that the statute requires a motivating factor standard of causation.117
Section 1981 was originally enacted under the Civil Rights Act of
1866118 to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment and prohibit facially
discriminatory laws in the post-Civil War South.119 In contrast to
Comcast’s assertion that § 1981 was meant to be narrow in scope,
Congress has repeatedly taken steps to broaden § 1981. When first
drafting the statute, Congress specifically chose broad language.120 A
prior version of the statute used “on account of” instead of “same
right” as the operative language.121 Congress rejected the “on account
of” language in favor of “same right” to broaden the scope of the
statute.122 Over one hundred years later Congress further broadened §
1981’s scope by defining “make” to cover all aspects of the contract
making and revising process.123 The legislative history of § 1981
indicates Congress specifically crafted it to be broad, encompassing
more than just claims that could satisfy the “but-for” causal standard.124
Finally, ESN rebuts Comcast’s contention that tort law firmly
established but-for causation when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
enacted.125 The cases Comcast cites to support their argument concern
negligence claims.126 Discrimination, in contrast, is an intentional tort.
Consequently, the negligence cases describing but-for causation do not
shed light on the legal background of discrimination law in 1866.127 It

117. Id. at 34.
118. Id. at 35.
119. See id. at 44–45 (arguing that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a sweeping
solution to the Black Codes).
120. See id. at 35 (“Critically, the phrase ‘by reason of’ does not appear in section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. This shows that Congress knew how to use language that connotes butfor causation, but made a deliberate choice to use broader language in defining the rights
protected by section 1981.”).
121. Id. at 36.
122. Id. at 35 (“Congress knew how to use language that connotes but-for causation but made
a deliberate choice not to include that language in the final bill.”).
123. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (defining “make and enforce” to include pre and post-contracting
actions).
124. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 48 (“Given the broad remedial purpose of
section 1981, a ‘motivating factor’ pleading standard with burden shifting is appropriate.”).
125. Id. at 39.
126. Id. at 15.
127. See id. at 41 (“Comcast mistakenly relies on 19th century tort cases involving negligence,
not intentional torts . . . [t]here were no general rules on factual causation in intentional torts in
the mid-19th century.”).
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was not until later in the nineteenth century that tort causation
standards started to formalize into but-for causation and proximate
cause, and intentional torts started to move away from strict liability.128
Therefore, it is incorrect to state that but-for cause was the sine qua non
of all tort law in 1866.
V. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court should hold that ESN has asserted a valid §
1981 claim because it has properly alleged that racial animus was a
motivating factor in Comcast’s refusal to carry ESN’s channels. The
first two arguments recognize the changing face of racism in the United
States and the difficulties that even sophisticated and well-funded
plaintiffs, like ESN, have in satisfying a but-for casual standard. First,
the way in which racial animus appears in hiring and contracting has
changed greatly since Congress enacted § 1981 in 1866, and therefore,
the standard of causation should reflect those changes. Second, ESN is
not covered under Title VII because it is not an employee – but rather
a business – analogous to a business owner or an independent
contractor. Because ESN may not take advantage of Title VII’s lower
causal standard, it must meet the almost impossible but-for causal
standard before proceeding to discovery, making it likely that it will be
left without meaningful remedy. The second two arguments address
concerns that a motivating factor standard will open the litigation
floodgates to frivolous claims and will impose greater costs on
companies who face litigation under § 1981. First, the concern about
frivolous claims is unwarranted because pleadings standards still act as
the gatekeepers to litigation. Second, a motivating-factor test will not
impose greater costs on employers because they should already be used
to a motivating-factor causal standard under Title VII discriminatory
hiring claims.
A. The Changing Face of Racism and Barriers to Meeting a But-for
Causal Standard.
First, racial discrimination today no longer looks like it did in 1866,
and the causal standard for proving racial discrimination in contracting
should reflect this change. When the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
passed, racial animus was overt, normalized, and outwardly violent.129
128. See id. at 42.
129. See generally Frank and Monroe, supra note 91 (describing the racial animus present
during Civil Rights Act of 1866).
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Today, racism no longer looks like the Black Codes, but rather is more
covert. Getting at discriminatory intent and not just disparate impact is
even harder as companies hire lawyers to help them avoid liability. The
Court has even said that discriminatory intent is “one that is often not
susceptible to direct proof[,]” but rather comes in the form of
inferences from circumstantial evidence.130 Furthermore, those who
discriminate on the basis of race “may be sufficiently sophisticated or
wary of litigation so as to not broadcast their intentions.”131
Although a Comcast executive allegedly made a comment about
not creating Bob Johnsons,132 it is hard to believe that there is a smoking
gun that revealed that the only reason Comcast refused to carry ESN’s
channels was because ESN is solely owned by African-Americans.
Large companies like Comcast take steps and hire attorneys
specifically to advise them on how to avoid liability and would lose
business if they outwardly promoted racist practices.133 Companies
today take proactive steps to guard themselves against discrimination
claims. Yet, news stories of racist hiring practices and other policies such
as grooming and dress code continue to surface, revealing that racist
policies persist even in the absence of smoking gun, overtly racist
evidence. Rather, racial animus comes out in quick comments,
“neutral” policies based on neatness, and subtle actions. Just because
racial animus does not look like a legal structure of segregation does
not mean it is harmless.
This issue becomes even weightier at the pleadings stage because
“the facts necessary to prove these claims are largely in the control of
the defendant.”134 Even though the procedural posture of this case is
lengthy, the case has not made it to discovery phase.135 Consequently,
ESN has not been privy to documents, records, phone calls, and other
evidence that would reveal whether Comcast refused to carry ESN’s
channels because of the racial makeup of its ownership. The only
evidence ESN currently has is the statement an executive made about
Bob Johnson and the fact that ESN’s channels were denied while less

130. Washington v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 1288, 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(quoting Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 618 (1982)).
131. Brief of Lawyers’ Committee, supra note 4, at 24 (“[I]ndependent contractors would be
particularly vulnerable to racial discrimination under a heightened evidentiary standard.”).
132. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 4–5.
133. Brief of Lawyers’ Committee, supra note 4, at 24.
134. Id. at 23.
135. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that the case has not proceeded past
the pleadings stage and has not advanced to discovery).

CONTRACTING FREE FROM RACIAL ANIMUS (DO NOT DELETE)

94

2/24/2020 11:20 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 15

successful white-owned networks were carried. Any other evidence is
in Comcast’s control and out of ESN’s reach. To say that ESN then must
assert enough facts to show that racial animus was the but-for cause of
Comcast’s refusal to contract is an insurmountable hurdle. In fact,
applying the but-for causal standard, the district court held three times
that ESN did not assert enough facts to bring a valid § 1981 claim.
Without access to any other evidence which would allow them to assert
more facts, the but-for causal standard keeps ESN from access to any
remedy.
ESN is not alone in this issue. Plaintiffs bringing § 1981 claims have
“limited success at every level of the [litigation process]” and often lack
access to counsel and other legal experts.136 If a multi-million dollar
company such as ESN cannot gain access to enough information to
successfully meet the but-for causal standard, then the ordinary
individual will certainly not be able to meet the but-for causal standard
either. It is nearly impossible today for a victim of racial discrimination
to satisfy the but-for causal standard at any stage of litigation—but
especially at the pleadings stage. Although a but-for causal standard
may have made sense in 1866 or even in 1991, it is simply not working
today. If § 1981 is to fulfill its promise of guaranteeing people of color
the same right to contract as white people, a but-for causal standard is
inappropriate.
Second, § 1981 claims should require a motivating factor standard
because § 1981 provides the only means of redress for those who do not
qualify as “employees” under Title VII. Business owners, interns, and
companies do not qualify for Title VII protections. In addition, the First,
Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have also held that
independent contractors are not covered by Title VII protections.137
Therefore, § 1981 “serves as a vital safe harbor” for a significant section
of the workforce who face racial discrimination in contracting but who
do not fit into Title VII’s definition of “employee”.
Because ESN is not an employee, but a business, it cannot bring a
claim under Title VII, and therefore § 1981 is the only avenue for ESN
to vindicate its right to contract free of racial animus. Because of its
status as a business, it must meet the almost impossible but-for causal
136. See Brief of Lawyers’ Committee, supra note 4, at 26, 23.
137. See Alberty-Velez v. Corporacion de P.R. para la Difusion Publica, 361 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2004); Scott v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, 523 Fed. App’x 911 (3d Cir. 2013); Ost v. West
Suburban Travelers Limousine, 88 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 1996); Wortham v. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 385
F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2004); Brackens v. Best Cabs, Inc., 146 Fed. App’x 242 (10th Cir. 2005).
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standard in order to receive remedy for wrongful discrimination in
contracting. While ESN is a multimillion-dollar company, most
minority owned business are small mom-and-pop shops who are
already vulnerable against larger corporations like Comcast.138 Making
these small business owners satisfy a but-for causal standard will
prevent them from vindicating their right to contract free of racial
animus. If they are not able to seek remedy, larger companies like
Comcast will be able to continue to discriminate based on race without
repercussion.
Not only will many businesses be without a remedy, but so will
anyone who does not fall under the definition of “employee” under
Title VII. One especially vulnerable group is independent contractors
of color who look to § 1981 for their sole avenue of redress.139 The
number of independent contracting jobs in the United States is steadily
increasing, and “African Americans, Hispanics, and . . . women of color
are overrepresented in low-wage independent contractor jobs.”140
Subjecting these independent contractors of color to a but-for causal
standard simply because they are not classified as “employees” seems
patently unfair. For example, suppose there is an adjunct professor who
is not classified as an employee and is not promoted to a full-time
position based on his race. In order to seek redress he must bring a
claim under § 1981 and satisfy a but-for causal burden. In contrast, a
professor who is classified as an “employee” and is refused promotion
due to his race can bring a claim under Title VII, and must only satisfy
a motivating-factor causal standard. Both professors are victims of
impermissible racial discrimination, yet only one must satisfy an almost
impossible causal burden while the other has an opportunity for
remedy, first through EEOC orders and then through the courts. The
two professors should have to satisfy the same causal burden so that
they can both vindicate their right to contract free of racial animus.
Therefore, instead of helping people of color and minority-owned
businesses vindicate their right to contract, a but-for causal standard
under § 1981 instead closes the door to a meaningful remedy when a
person or company has been the victim of discriminatory contracting
practices. ESN’s inability to meet the but-for causal standard represents
a whole group of people of color who cannot access remedy when they
138. Minority Bus. Dev. Ass’n, U.S. Business Fact Sheets, https://www.mbda.gov/page/usbusiness-fact-sheets (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
139. See Brief of Lawyers’ Committee, supra note 4, at 16.
140. Id. at 18.
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are discriminated against simply because they are not classified as
“employees.” Both ESN and all other non-employees these other
people should be held to the same standard as those who are eligible
to bring claims under Title VII; they should be held to a motivatingfactor causal standard.
B. Frivolous Claims and Cost Concerns
One concern that opponents of a motivating-factor standard have
is that lowering the causal standard will open the litigation floodgates
to frivolous §1981 claims. If these frivolous claims continue to discovery
and beyond, companies like Comcast will have to spend exorbitant
amounts of time, money, and energy to defend against false claims,
whereas a but-for causal standard keeps these frivolous claims out in
the first place. This concern, however, is overstated; pleading standards
still function as an essential gatekeeper for litigation and keep frivolous
claims out.
Under a motivating-factor standard, a plaintiff would still have to
present allegations which “plausibly suggest”141 that racial animus was
a motivating factor in the contracting decision pursuant to Rule Eight
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.142 A claim is plausible when
there are enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”143 Only such facts and not
mere conclusory allegations are “entitled to be assumed true” when
deciding whether a plaintiff has properly stated a claim.144 Therefore, to
continue past the pleading stage and go onto discovery, ESN would still
have to present enough facts to state a “plausible” claim that racial
animus was a motivating factor in Comcast’s refusal to carry their
channels. If ESN is unable to meet this burden, the case will be
dismissed. It is true that ESN would have to assert fewer facts at the
pleading stage under a motivating-factor than a but-for causal standard.
But without discovery, ESN simply does not yet have concrete proof of
racial discrimination. They only have circumstantial evidence based on
disparate treatment. This lack of access to information at the pleading
stage does not indicate weakness in ESN’s assertions, but is simply a
function of Comcast having sole control over the materials that would
likely reveal express racial animus. Consequently, a motivating-factor
141.
142.
143.
144.

Bell Tel. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007).
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
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standard is not an open door to frivolous discrimination claims; it is
merely a recognition that evidence of overt racial animus is difficult, if
not impossible, to obtain prior to discovery.
A second concern regarding the motivating-factor standard is that
this lower burden will impose significant costs on companies like
Comcast who now must proceed to discovery and further defend
themselves against discriminatory contracting claims. Again, this
concern is overstated. Companies like Comcast are already familiar
with motivating-factor causal standards in discrimination suits under
Title VII. While Comcast’s decisions not to carry networks do not fall
under Title VII liability, all of its interactions with its employees do fall
under Title VII. Therefore, each time Comcast hires, fires, promotes, or
suspends an employee, or implements a new dress code or standard of
conduct, Comcast is engaging in actions that Title VII addresses.
Because Comcast engages in these actions daily, they know what is at
stake when they impermissibly consider race when making contracting
and employment decisions. They know how to litigate and defend
themselves against a motivating-factor causal standard because they
have been doing it in Title VII cases since the 1980s. Plainly, Comcast
already knows how defend itself against discrimination claims that
require a motivating-factor causal standard. A motivating-factor causal
standard under § 1981 would just require Comcast to apply the same
strategies it uses to avoid and defend itself against Title VII claims to
claims brought by independent contractors and other companies.
Because they already have the tools and experience to do this, they
should not be subject to undue costs.
CONCLUSION
Under § 1981, ESN should be required to show that racial animus
was a motivating-factor, not the but-for cause, of Contract’s refusal to
carry their channels. Holding plaintiffs like ESN to a but-for causal
standard would impact minority businesses and employees, giving them
the impossible task of proving that racial animus was the sole cause for
refusal to contract before proceeding to discovery. Without access to
important documents in the defendant’s possession, these minority
businesses and employees are left without remedy and unjustly denied
access to the courts. Holding ESN to the high but-for causal standard
would unjustly deny them access to the Court. This result is unjust and
goes against § 1981’s guarantee that people of color have the same right
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to contract as white individuals.145 Therefore, the Supreme Court should
affirm the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and hold that § 1981 requires a
motivating factor, and not a but-for causal standard.

145. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).

